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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent disasters have demonstrated the importance of mitigating their potential 
impact to not only protect human lives, but to also reduce the seemingly unending cycle of 
repeated damages. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 requires state, local, and tribal 
governments to have FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation Plans in order to qualify for 
certain types of Federal funding.  However, even with these mandates in place, there are a 
number of local governments that have yet to adopt a FEMA-approved multi-hazard 
mitigation plan.  Although multi-hazard mitigation plans seem rational for reducing the 
impact of hazards, efforts to prepare plans and implement mitigation-related activities are 
oftentimes met with resistance at the local jurisdictional level.  The purpose of this 
qualitative study is to inductively examine the social, financial, and political conditions and 
forces that contribute to the decision to adopt or not adopt a hazard mitigation plan in the 
Red River Valley. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
  
Recent disasters have shown that new technologies and efforts cannot completely 
safeguard individuals, assets, and communities from both natural and manmade disasters.  
Furthermore, sustained population growth in many parts of the world, and the ever-
increasing number of individuals residing in high-risk areas also raises the probability of 
future disasters and increased damages and casualties.  For example, in the United States 
alone, almost 60 percent of the U.S. population lives in areas prone to major disasters 
(Carr, 2007).  However, the mere occurrence of a hazardous event is not enough to result in 
the loss of life and damage to properties.  Losses occur when the impact of the hazard 
overwhelms the natural and/or built environment and the capabilities of the individuals or 
groups exposed to that event (Alesch and Petak, 2001).  In other words, there must also be 
a certain level of vulnerability for losses to occur. Fortunately, these vulnerabilities can be 
reduced if adjustments are made prior to the event, which serves as the impetus for 
comprehensive, multi-hazard, mitigation planning.   
According to the Robert T. Stafford Act, mitigation is defined as “any sustained 
action to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their 
effects” (Title 44, Part 206.40).  In other words, mitigation planning is a process by which 
communities identify and assess their risk associated with potential hazards, and 
accordingly develop and implement long-term strategies and actions for protecting people 
and property (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2007).   
1.1. Study Rationale 
 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2009b), there are over 39,000 local 
jurisdictions in the United States, and each one is eligible and strongly encouraged to 
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participate in hazard mitigation programs and activities.  Although there is growing 
consensus and recognition of the value of mitigation, many local jurisdictions have failed 
to complete even the most basic step – develop and adopt a FEMA-Approved Multi-Hazard 
Mitigation Plan.  As of January 2009, less than 50 percent of local jurisdictions (counties, 
municipalities, towns, and townships) in the United States were served by a federally 
approved mitigation plan (Yoon, Youngs, and Abe, 2012).   
As illustrated by Figure 1, states in the Central Plains region of the U.S. have a 
lower percentage of their local governments completing multi-hazard mitigation plans.  
These percentages represent the number of local jurisdictions with approved hazard 
mitigation plans over the total number of eligible local jurisdictions.  Table 1 presents a 
more detailed overview of the status of hazard mitigation plan adoption by states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source. Yoon, Abe, and Youngs (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Percent of Local Jurisdictions in each State with Mitigation Plans (Yoon et al, 
2012) 
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Table 1.  Percent of Local Jurisdictions by State Having Approved Hazard Mitigation Plans 
in 2009 (Yoon et al, 2012) 
 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Adoption Rate States 
More than 90% adoption Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Utah, North Carolina, Delaware, D.C., Hawaii 
80% - 89% Maine, Montana, Georgia, Kentucky, Virginia 
70% - 79% New Hampshire, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Wyoming, Washington, Mississippi, Maryland, Michigan 
60% - 69% California, Missouri 
50% - 59% Vermont, Connecticut, Texas, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Tennessee, Nevada 
40% - 49% Idaho, Colorado, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Oregon, New York, Ohio, Massachusetts 
30% - 39% Alaska 
20% - 29% Iowa, New Jersey, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota 
10% - 19% South Dakota, Indiana, Illinois 
Less than 10% Nebraska, Kansas 
 
 
Although multi-hazard mitigation strategies are important for reducing the impact 
of hazards, the existence of mitigation plans is lacking in certain areas as shown in Table 1.  
However, the importance of adopting and maintaining these plans is increasingly essential 
today as a result of Public Law 106-390, also known as the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 
(DMA 2000). DMA 2000 provides the legal foundation for mitigation planning in the 
United States, and sets the planning requirements for State, local and Indian Tribal 
governments. DMA 2000 amended the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act in October of 2000 by repealing the previous mitigation planning provisions 
and replacing them with a new set of requirements that emphasize the need to closely 
coordinate mitigation planning and implementation efforts. Specifically, a FEMA-
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Approved Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan must include, at minimum, the following 
elements: documentation to demonstrate participation in the planning process; a hazard 
identification and risk assessment component; mitigation goals and strategies to 
reduce/avoid vulnerabilities; documentation to demonstrate the maintenance and 
implementation of the plan (for plan updates only); and lastly, documentation that the plan 
was formally adopted (FEMA, 2013). 
Due to the real and perceived benefits of implementing hazard mitigation programs, 
the U.S. Federal government now requires local and state governments to have a FEMA-
Approved Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan as established by DMA 2000 in order to qualify 
for Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) project 
grant dollars (FEMA, 2007).  These programs are critical sources of Federal funding, 
especially for a community that wants to proactively initiate mitigation projects using PDM 
dollars, or for a community that needs HMGP funding following a presidentially declared 
disaster.  Consequently, with the enactment of the DMA 2000, hazard mitigation planning 
is more salient in the United States.  In fact, Schwab and Brower (2008) state that many of 
the communities that have participated probably would not have done so had it not been for 
this Act.  
Although DMA 2000 serves to strongly encourage local jurisdictions to adopt and 
maintain hazard mitigation plans, overall compliance to do so has been surprisingly low in 
some areas.  The fact that so many local jurisdictions lack mitigation plans is disconcerting.  
Furthermore, because local governments serve as the “point of delivery” for hazard-related 
policies, and consequently play a major role in the collective success or failure of hazard 
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mitigation policies in the United States (Prater and Lindell, 2000, p. 81), it is critical to 
understand why so many jurisdictions fail to adopt and maintain these plans.   
One reason for the lack of compliance may be the limited capacity and capabilities 
of these communities (Alesch and Petak, 2001).  Capacity, in reference to disaster 
management planning and operations, can be broadly defined as the amount of resources – 
both tangible and intangible – that are available [at the individual and/or organizational 
levels] to execute or carry out certain functions to promote the safety and well-being of a 
community (Yoon et al., 2012).  Here, the concept of capacity is used in very general terms 
and simply conveys whether or not jurisdictions or the individuals preparing the plan, have 
the knowledge, experience, resources, and support to carry out the necessary steps to fulfill 
the mitigation plan requirement.  
1.2. Research Question 
 
The purpose of this qualitative study, then, is to explore the following question: 
What factors, conditions, and forces contribute to and promote the development and 
adoption of a FEMA-Approved Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan in the Red River Valley?  
Specifically, this study investigates the role of capacity and seeks to refine this concept by 
understanding how capacity affects the local jurisdictions’ motivation or ability to develop 
and maintain hazard mitigation plans.  As part of this study, it was important to understand 
how emergency managers perceived and interpreted the mitigation planning directorate, 
and to discover what factors and conditions enabled or prevented these emergency 
managers from developing and adopting hazard mitigation plans.  
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1.3. Study Area 
 
This study focuses specifically on the Red River Valley.  As illustrated by Figure 2, 
the Red River of the North Basin includes parts of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
and Manitoba.  This study focused specifically on local jurisdictions (counties and 
municipalities) in the Red River Valley in the state of North Dakota.  In addition, the 
selection of the Red River Valley presented an interesting study area for the following 
reasons: 1) Jurisdictions in the study area share common hazards, primarily flooding from 
the Red River of the North; 2) the Red River Valley recently faced historic flooding; and 3) 
the jurisdictions in the Red River Valley are mostly rural. Additionally, overall compliance 
of local municipalities (cities and towns) in North Dakota was relatively low compared to 
other states (see Table 1). Table 2 provides the mitigation plan approval status for the 
counties and municipalities within the study area.  
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North Dakota 
Approved Not Approved 
Eddy Rolette 
Nelson* Benson 
Sargent Sheridan 
Cass Steele 
Pierce**  
Wells**  
Foster**  
Griggs  
Grand Forks**  
Richland**  
Cavalier  
Pembina**  
Barnes**  
Towner  
Ramsey  
Ransom**  
Traill  
Walsh**  
*Expires within 30 days **Expired 
 
Source. FEMA (2009c) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Red River of the North Basin (Ecological Research Division Environment 
Canada, 1999) 
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The following counties below (see Table 2) were selected for this study due to their 
location within the Red River Valley of the North Basin: 
 
Table 2. ND Municipalities’ Mitigation Approval Status as of 1/31/2009 (FEMA, 2009c) 
County # of Municipalities # Approved Percent Approved 
Pembina 23 11 47.83 
Cass 60 27 45.00 
Walsh 44 13 29.55 
Traill 28 8 28.57 
Ramsey 38 10 26.32 
Sargent 27 7 25.93 
Cavalier 47 12 25.53 
Barnes 54 13 24.07 
Nelson 31 7 22.58 
Foster 20 4 20.00 
Grand Forks 52 10 19.23 
Ransom 26 5 19.23 
Pierce 17 3 17.65 
Wells 40 7 17.50 
Towner 33 5 15.15 
Griggs 20 3 15.00 
Richland 40 5 12.50 
Eddy 18 2 11.11 
Rolette 9 0 0 
Benson 41 0 0 
Sheridan 15 0 0 
Steele 21 0 0 
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In closing, this chapter described the study rationale, and provide an overarching 
description of the challenges many communities face regarding the development and 
maintenance of their respective hazard mitigation plans.  The following chapters are 
organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing literature and specifically 
discusses factors that contribute to hazard mitigation planning and previous findings related 
to the concept of capacity. Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology, 
Chapter 4 provides the key findings from the study, and Chapter 5 discusses the findings in 
relationship to the existing literature. The concluding Chapter provides a summary of the 
study, discusses research limitations, and identifies opportunities for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review focuses on a broad range of published studies related to 
mitigation planning.  Specifically, this review addresses the concept of capacity, and also 
includes a discussion of interrelated topics including salience, risk perception, and 
expectation of losses.  
2.1. Factors Contributing to Hazard Mitigation Plan Development 
 
Whether or not hazard mitigation plans are adopted by local governments is 
dependent upon many complex factors.  Although it is easy to presume that the reluctance 
on the part of local jurisdictions and their respective governments to embrace risk reduction 
policies is the result of decision-makers underestimating or simply being unaware of the 
potential risks facing their communities, the problem is not quite that simple.  In order to 
effectively examine the factors contributing to hazard mitigation plan preparedness at any 
level, it is important to first recognize that these decisions are made as a result of the 
interactions and experiences of key players acting within complex social systems and 
processes, which includes the efforts to meet various institutional demands within their 
respective communities or organizations.  This is further supported by the growing body of 
literature suggesting that disasters and the perception of risk are, to a large degree, socially 
constructed (Tierney, 1989; McEntire and Marshall, 2003; Bolin and Stanford, 1999); and 
suggests that the assessment of hazards and their potential risks are by no means made 
purely at an objective level.  Instead, it suggests that the decision to adopt and implement 
disaster-related policies and actions are largely influenced by social conditions and forces 
that are not necessarily obvious to the public or to the decision-makers themselves.     
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2.1.1. Salience and Risk Perception 
 
Although a review of the disaster literature tends to support the perception that 
previous experiences with disasters have a positive influence on a jurisdiction’s willingness 
to engage in mitigation-related activities (Yoon et al., 2012; Prater and Lindell, 2000; 
Banerjee and Gillespie, 1994; Pearce, 2003; Seigrist and Gutscher, 2008; and Wolensky 
and Wolensky, 1990), many local governments do not face the immediate and/or the 
constant threat of a hazard on a day-to-day basis.  Therefore, hazard mitigation related 
activities are not something that garners a lot of attention prior to a disaster or catastrophic 
event occurring in that jurisdiction.  However, according to Ciglar (2006/2007),  “the 
governments least likely to perceive the threat of disaster as a very high priority (local 
governments) are at center stage in terms of responsibility and are limited in their capacity 
– financial, managerial, technical, and political will – to deal with hazards” (p. 4). 
With respect to mitigation planning, Godschalk and Brower (1985) indicate that the 
lack of initiative toward mitigation activities and strategies by local governments may be 
because low priority is given to disaster-related policies in many of these communities.   
Upon reviewing the disaster literature, Tierney (1989) also concludes that certain 
challenges associated with promoting hazard mitigation activities can be seen as the result 
of low salience of overall disaster-related policies in a community.  Similarly, Birkland 
(1997) and Prater and Lindell (2000) seem to believe that the adoption of disaster-related 
polices remains low because many jurisdictions are already faced with challenging day-to-
day problems, which supersede the need to engage in hazard mitigation activities, 
especially since the disaster itself may never occur.  
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According to Alesch and Petak (2001), there must be a collective acknowledgement 
or perception among key decision-makers within a community that an adverse risk exists.  
Lindell and Perry (1992) further reiterate that in order to formulate a successful hazard 
mitigation program, a community must “first be aware that the hazards exist and believe 
[italics added] that a risk of significant negative consequences is posed” (p. 30).  In 
addition to having a certain level of awareness of the potential hazards facing a community, 
Schwab and Brower (2008) suggest that those decision-makers must also accept that they 
are both capable and responsible for minimizing those risks (p.38).       
As Berke and Smith (2009) state, “mitigation is often reduced to a series of 
disconnected projects intended to address past mistakes, and is therefore not part of a 
comprehensive and integrated planning approach” (p. 7).  As such, the mitigation strategies 
and actions identified in local mitigation plans can be very revealing, and may suggest 
communities’ awareness of their risks and the perceived value mitigation planning offers to 
their respective jurisdictions. 
Birkland’s (1997) research on focusing events seems to suggest that “the disaster 
problem,” such as the limited participation of local jurisdictions in adopting hazard 
mitigation plans, will continue to languish “near the bottom of national, state, and local 
priorities until the problem is elevated on the agenda, not by political activity, a change in 
indicators, or some political perturbation, but by a completely exogenous and largely 
unpredictable event” (p. 49).  Tierney (1989) argues, however, that “disaster events do not 
open windows of opportunity [italics added] merely by increasing the salience of a 
problem” (p. 380).  Greater salience is achieved, rather, when the “operation of the political 
economy” is disrupted (p. 380).  This can be achieved when groups mobilize after a 
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disaster and temporarily counteract the power of influential economic and political 
stakeholders (Tierney, 1989).  The challenge, though, is that under the current political 
environment in many local communities, it is difficult to find a broad-based constituency 
base championing the need for mitigation-related activities before, during, and even after 
an event.  Instead, it is more likely that hazard and risk reduction measures will face direct 
opposition, especially when private property and economic freedoms are threatened.     
 
2.1.2. Expectation of Losses 
One of the most important factors in the discussion of risk perception and salience 
as a motivator for hazard mitigation planning is that local jurisdictions and their 
governments must have the expectation that they will suffer losses if no actions are taken to 
prepare or mitigate the potential risks posed to that community (Alesch and Petak, 2001).  
For hazard mitigation plans and their subsequent actions to have any legitimacy, they must 
be seen as viable solutions to minimizing the potential damages from natural and manmade 
hazards.  The expectation of losses from a potential disaster must also exceed the 
rationalizations presented by the opposing forces that normally confound or delay 
mitigation efforts. 
2.2. Capacity and Capability 
 
Even in communities where the potential risks from hazards are acknowledged, and 
support for disaster-related policies are high, hazard mitigation plan compliance may still 
be low.  One reason may be due to the lack of capacity and limited capabilities of that 
community (Alesch and Petak, 2001).  Though the two terms, capacity and capability, are 
oftentimes used interchangeably in the disaster literature, it is useful to conceptually 
delineate the two terms.  Capacity, in reference to disaster management planning, can be 
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broadly defined as the amount of resources available to an organization to execute or carry 
out certain functions to promote the safety and well-being of a community.  Although very 
similar to capacity, capability, with regards to disaster management, can be defined as the 
actual ability of an institution or individual to perform actions necessary to anticipate, 
prevent, prepare for, cope with, respond to, or recover from the impact of a hazard.  The 
purpose of delineating the two concepts is simply to show that having capacity, or the 
essential resources in-hand, does not necessarily translate into being capable of executing 
those actions.  Capacity simply expresses the potential to act accordingly based on the 
availability of resources, which can be both tangible and intangible.  Capability, then, could 
be considered the sum total of the knowledge, support, and experience required to perform 
or accomplish a certain task.  With respect to disaster management, it is important to have 
both capacity and capability.   
An analysis of the disaster literature regarding these two concepts seems to indicate 
that capacity and/or capability building is an important component to addressing a 
community’s vulnerabilities and, as a consequence, increases a local jurisdiction’s 
resilience to hazards.  Regarding matters specific to hazard mitigation, Schwab and Brower 
(2008) specify that capacity building “infers that the knowledge base necessary to plan for 
and implement hazard mitigation measures primarily reside within the community itself” 
(p. 38).  Similarly, Kapuco (2007) defined capacity building as the means by which a 
community can “tap into its own strengths and abilities” (p. 23).  Kapuco (2007) further 
reiterates that capacity building is contingent upon having the necessary resources and the 
will to mobilize them.  Schwab, Eschelebach, and Brower (2007) use the concept of 
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capability to include the community’s “institutional framework, technical know-how, and 
ability to pay for mitigation” (p. 453).   
In this study, all major aspects of capacity were explored; however, the current 
literature seems to focus – albeit somewhat sparsely – on the following categories:  human 
resource capacity, financial resource capacity, and political resource capacity.  Even though 
other categories likely exist, these three categories serve as major factors for disaster 
planning at the local jurisdictional level.   
2.2.1. Financial Resource Capacity 
Financial resource capacity can be broadly defined as the availability of funds or the 
fiscal flexibility within a community to support the adoption and implementation of local 
hazard mitigation activities.  Schwab and Brower (2008) introduce the concept of “fiscal 
capability,” which they define as the ability to “fund or to seek funding for mitigation 
projects and activities” (p. 10173).  According to Schwab and Brower (2008), local 
governments can increase their financial capacity by using creative means to fund or 
finance mitigation activities instead of relying on the typical revenue streams sponsored by 
the state and federal governments.  Alesch and Petak (2001), in referring to organizational 
capacity within earthquake prone areas, observe that businesses and organizations that are 
well established and are profitable are more likely to engage in mitigation type activities 
than those that are not.  
Acknowledging factors within the broader category of financial resource capacity in 
this study is important because, as Lindell and Perry (1992) report, many local jurisdictions 
and their governments, on average, allocate minimal financial support toward their 
emergency management departments, their functions, and operations.  Consequently, 
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Lindell and Perry (1992) observe that local jurisdictions face far greater financial 
constraints than their state and federal counterparts.  Similarly, Boswell, Siembieda, and 
Topping (2007) found that many of the communities in California that did not prepare local 
hazard mitigation plans were typically smaller and had a high percentage of their local 
population below the poverty line when compared to communities that had adopted plans.  
They suggested that the lack of resources, such as limited funding and staff, may have 
contributed to their failure to adopt plans (Boswell, Siembieda, and Topping, 2007).  
2.2.2. Human Resource Capacity 
Human resource capacity can be broadly defined as the availability of staff and 
personnel who have the technical know-how, experience, and time to adequately coordinate 
the development and implementation of hazard mitigation plans, including other aspects of 
disaster management activities within a community.  Rubin and Barbee (1985) indicate that 
it is important for local jurisdictions to not only have the “ability to act” but also have the 
“knowledge of what to do.”  Therefore, the importance of having experienced staff cannot 
be overstated.   
Much of the literature suggests that the lack of human capacity, namely inadequate 
staffing levels and lack of technical expertise at both the state and local levels, seems to 
hinder proactive steps to adopt or implement mitigation plans because of the insufficient 
levels of manpower and/or experience (Godschalk and Brower, 1985; Alesch and Petak, 
2001; Boswell, Siembieda, and Topping, 2007; Tierney, 1989; Rubin and Barbee, 1985).  
However, it should be noted that one study by Berke, Beatley and Whilhite (1989) did not 
find a significant relationship between the number of staff hours allocated and the adoption 
of planning measures for mitigation within earthquake prone areas.  According to 
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Godschalk and Brower (1985), the technical complexities of adopting hazard mitigation 
plans can oftentimes be beyond the capabilities of many government employees.  Referring 
specifically to mitigation, Schwab and Brower (2008) define technical capability as “the 
ability to carry out hazard identification and vulnerability analyses to produce accurate 
information regarding where and to what extent hazards are likely to impact the 
community” (p. 10173).  Berke and Smith (2009) defined “technical capacity” as having 
accessibility to analytical tools, such as GIS, and the associated skills to utilize those tools 
within the mitigation planning process. So, in addition to having adequate staffing levels, 
local jurisdictions must also be concerned with making available or acquiring experienced 
personnel.   
In their study comparing urban and rural mitigation plans for quality, Horney, 
Naimi, Lyles, Simon, Salvesen, and Berke (2012), found that urban areas typically had a 
greater “existing capacity” to plan overall (p. 189). Specifically, Horney et al. (2012) 
suggest that having more full-time staff or certified planners, technology, the capability to 
support participation opportunities for stakeholders, and having “more extensive 
information available online” can conceivably enhance certain aspects of the hazard 
mitigation planning process (p. 189). 
Smith, Lyles, and Berke (2012) suggest that one of the reasons why mitigation plan 
quality is lacking could be attributed to the fact that mitigation plans are predominantly led 
by emergency managers and not planners. Similarly, Berke and Smith (2009) state that 
“local land use planners fail to recognize that hazard mitigation planning falls within their 
professional purview” (p. 8). Instead, Berke and Smith (2009) state that mitigation planning 
is “framed in the context of emergency management and considered the responsibility of 
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local emergency management officials even though they possess limited experience in land 
use planning and working with local planning officials” (p. 8 ). 
2.2.3. Political Resource Capacity 
Political resource capacity can be defined as the level of political resolve and 
overall support that is present within a community to back hazard mitigation activities and 
policies.  Schwab and Brower (2008) define political capacity as the “willpower to propose 
and carry out enduring mitigation strategies notwithstanding the shortened horizon of some 
elected positions” (p. 10173).  Other factors, such as a local government’s level of 
adaptability and flexibility to consider new policies and actions, are also part of gauging a 
community’s level of political capacity (Rubin and Barbee, 1985).  According to Schwab, 
Eschelebach, and Brower (2007), the absence of political support can be one of the biggest 
obstacles to implementing hazard mitigation strategies, which is why factors related to 
political capacity are important to this discussion.  
From a broader perspective, the success or failure of mitigation efforts largely 
depend upon the political environment within that community (Wyner, 1984).  Due in part 
to our nation’s “culture of individualism and the sanctity of private property,” these cultural 
values and expectations in the United States elucidate into why hazard mitigation programs 
may be met with certain trepidation (Mileti, 1999, p. 145).  Mileti (1999) indicates that this 
same respect for property is also shared in individuals’ right to accumulate profits.  This is 
one reason why political economy issues should be fundamental in our understanding of 
the challenges surrounding the adoption and implementation of hazard mitigation plans.  
Governments are faced with an interesting challenge in that they must be able to balance 
the need to promote capitalism and economic development while still fulfilling its 
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obligation to promote the safety and well-being of their community and citizens (Tierney, 
1989).  It is in this conflict that the drive to protect short-term profits and interests is often 
led by “economic elites and pro-development interest groups” who are typically “key 
actors in opposing hazard mitigation measures when they are proposed and in weakening 
those measures that are instituted” (Tierney, 1989, p. 378).  Consequently, with the 
involvement and self-interests of so many key stakeholders, adopting and implementing 
hazard mitigation initiatives can become a politically charged matter.  In some cases, it can 
also become a legal matter, which is another reason some local governments may hesitate 
to implement their plan.  Therefore, the need to mobilize a constituency and widespread 
support is critical.   
In order to increase a community’s political capacity to adopt hazard mitigation 
policies and actions, there is great need for the general public, or more specifically, a 
grassroots movement within that community to help put mitigation on the local political 
agenda, especially if local officials are less concerned (Lindell and Perry, 1992; Prater and 
Lindell, 2000; Schwab and Brower, 2008; Wyner, 1984).  Berke, Beatley, and Whilhite 
(1989) found that within the earthquake domain, the presence of advocates was one of the 
more significant factors in determining whether a community adopted mitigation activities. 
However, they suggest that the presence of advocates is most influential in those 
communities where mitigation planning has low salience, and not in communities where 
mitigation planning is already accepted or valued.  Similar to having an advocate, other 
researchers have emphasized the importance of having a policy entrepreneur to champion 
the issue of mitigation (Tierney, 1989; Wolensky and Wolensky, 1990; Prater and Lindell, 
2000; Olson and Olson, 1993).  An example of an effective policy entrepreneur would be 
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one who has a combination of “technical expertise in hazards with political expertise and 
personal commitment” (Prater and Lindell, 2000, p. 76).  However, from a realistic 
standpoint, an individual who fits those criteria may be hard to come by in a local 
community.  Therefore, Prater and Lindell (2000) stress that successful hazard mitigation 
policy entrepreneurs are those individuals who can form coalitions and involve subject 
matter experts in the planning process.  
Interestingly, Horney et al. (2012) found that rural areas possessed stronger inter-
organizational groups when compared with urban areas in their study, and suggested that 
rural areas may have more success in bringing additional stakeholders to the table to be part 
of the mitigation planning process. Specifically, Horney et al. (2012) indicate the 
following:   
Implementation in urban areas may be more complex in that it requires a broader 
set of local government and non-governmental actors to work in coordination. 
Similarly, the significantly stronger inter-organizational coordination seen in rural 
plans may reflect a greater homogeneity of the groups participating in the planning 
process. Many individuals in rural areas may work for multiple agencies or “wear 
many hats” as is common in rural areas that lack the personnel and resources to fill 
all positions. Organizations in rural communities are also likely to share a small 
staff with a long history of working together, particularly around disaster 
preparedness and response, which can contribute effective inter-organizational 
coordination and to a shared vision for future planning (190). 
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So, while rural jurisdictions may be at a disadvantage in areas such as human and financial 
capacity, these jurisdictions may be able to leverage their circumstances to create greater 
participation by developing a common vision for their jurisdiction.  
In closing, this chapter has attempted to briefly review and highlight the existing 
literature on this topic.  Although the literature is sparse and lacks significant substance and 
empirically-based findings, especially with respect to capacity and capability-building 
within the realm of emergency management, the existing literature does provide a good 
foundation and starting point in which to initiate this qualitative inquiry.   
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CHAPTER 3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This qualitative study examined the social, financial, and political conditions and 
forces that contributed to the adoption of hazard mitigation plans in North Dakota’s Red 
River Valley. This study specifically investigated the role of capacity, and how it impacts 
local jurisdictions’ level of hazard mitigation plan development.  In order to better 
understand this topic, the study specifically looked at the duties, motivations and 
perceptions of local emergency managers regarding the unique challenge of developing and 
adopting hazard mitigation plans in the Red River Valley.    
 In this study, the concept of capacity served as a “sensitizing concept” to “merely 
suggest directions along which to look” (Blumer, 1969, p. 148).  This approach also seems 
appropriate as the concept of capacity has been used intermittently in the disaster research 
literature, and has yet to be clearly delineated or operationalized.  As a result, the concept is 
used with little clarity.  As such, one of the main purposes of this thesis was to explore 
what capacity-related factors contributed to the development of a mitigation plan using a 
qualitative research approach of conducting in-depth interviews with local emergency 
managers.  In doing so, a deeper understanding of the concept’s meanings, attributes, and 
implications were gained. Furthermore, this approach is justified due to the importance of 
understanding the meanings associated with the requirement to fulfill the mitigation plan 
requirement, which provides a clearer understanding as to why certain jurisdictions do or 
do not comply with hazard mitigation plan directives. 
3.1. Unit of Analysis 
 
 Because the development and adoption of a community’s hazard mitigation plan 
takes place at the local jurisdictional level, the individuals selected to be interviewed 
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included the local jurisdictional employee that has been designated as the emergency 
manager or is the person most responsible for contributing to the development of the 
hazard mitigation plan in that community. For the purposes of this study, the respondent 
was the unit of data collection. The local jurisdiction, which is the unit of analysis, is 
defined as any county, city, town or township.  
This chapter presents the research design.  The next section begins with an 
overview of the population and selection process.  The chapter also includes a description 
of the data collection and data analysis process.  
3.2. Population 
 
 The focus of this study is all counties near the Red River Valley of the North Basin 
in North Dakota.  As indicated in Chapter 1 (see Study Area), a total of 38 counties 
comprise the study area.   For this study, local jurisdictions were defined as any county, 
municipality, town, or township.  In each of the 38 counties, the person most responsible to 
participate in developing the mitigation plan was contacted. Permission letters to the 
appropriate individuals were sent out and necessary IRB approvals were obtained (see 
Appendix B).  A census was employed because all elements in the population were 
contacted.  Of those who were contacted, in-depth interviews were conducted with 15 
emergency managers representing counties, municipalities, towns, and townships. Ten 
individuals at the county level agreed to participate in the interviews. Five individuals at 
the municipal level were also interviewed.  
 With assistance from the county emergency managers that were interviewed, 
municipal individuals were identified as possible interviewees. It should be noted that not 
all county emergency managers were willing or able to identify potential interviewees at 
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the municipal level.  The criteria for municipal level participants included participation in 
the mitigation plan process and someone who was most responsible for emergency 
management type responsibilities in their respective municipality.   
3.3. Data Collection 
 
 In-depth qualitative interviewing was the mode of data collection (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2005).  Although face-to-face interviews were preferred, 12 of the interviews were 
conducted via telephone.  The interviews were conducted from June 2011 to November 
2012. Also, in order to be consistent with the qualitative interviewing approach, the in-
depth interviewing process was semi-structured and neutral probes were used to prompt 
additional comments from participants as needed.  An interview guide was used to make 
sure key topics were covered. The guide included questions about perception, motivation, 
and capabilities pertaining to the mitigation plan development directive.  It should be noted 
that as the data collection process began, the interview guide was modified or expanded to 
include additional questions as new themes emerged.  Also, in addition to keeping detailed 
field notes, interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed.    
 As part of this study, participants were notified that this thesis, or any subsequent 
articles, will not contain identifiers such as names, addresses, or the names of local 
jurisdictions.  However, due to the limited size of the population area, confidentiality was 
not guaranteed. It should also be noted that during the time interviews were conducted, 
major spring flooding had been a regular annual occurrence in the Red River Valley.  
3.4. Data Analysis 
 
 During the analysis phase, relevant attributes related to capacity were coded from 
the raw interview data.  Similarities and differences between communities were also 
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analyzed. The results provided key insights into the perceived challenges facing local 
emergency managers regarding the development and adoption of hazard mitigation plans.  
 As stated previously, the overall purpose of this study is to clarify the concept of 
capacity as it relates specifically to hazard mitigation planning.  As part of this process, the 
researcher identified and coded for relevant themes, categories, attributes, descriptions, 
patterns, variations, and indicators to further clarify and refine this concept as it relates to 
emergency management.   
 Consistent with the approach recommended by Rubin and Rubin (2005), the data 
analysis process for this study involved five steps.  These included first, analyzing data 
throughout the entire data collection process; second, discovering and elaborating operative 
themes, categories and attributes; third, labeling each concept or theme; fourth, coding the 
interview transcriptions; and fifth, sorting and linking data to attain a holistic synthesis. 
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 
 
This study sought to capture the perceptions of the local jurisdictional employee 
most responsible for contributing to the development and maintenance of the hazard 
mitigation plan in his/her community. The research identified a broad range of issues, 
which will be discussed in this section.  The findings are organized into two major 
categories: 1) Motivations to develop a mitigation plan and 2) Capability and capacity 
factors that inhibit mitigation plan development and maintenance. 
Throughout the interview process, the researcher was cognizant of protecting the 
confidentiality of the participants. Because emergency management operates within a 
politically sensitive environment, it is especially important to be mindful of maintaining the 
confidentiality of the participants. Revealing names, places, and specifics would disclose 
the participant and their professional perspectives, which could, in some instances, 
compromise their position. For this reason, all names, affiliations and specificities that 
could reveal the individual participant and their contribution to the research were removed. 
4.1. Motivations to Develop and Maintain a Mitigation Plan 
 
 Although there are presumably many perceived benefits to mitigating the hazards in 
a community, it was interesting to note the interviewees’ responses when asked why they 
did or did not participate in the development of their communities’ hazard mitigation plan.   
Based on the researcher’s interpretation of the data, the motivations and reasons to develop 
and/or participate in the hazard mitigation plan development process can be described by 
the following themes: 1) meeting the federal mandate, 2) hazard experience and risk 
perception, and 3) perceived value (see Table 3).  
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Table 3.  Motivations to Develop a FEMA-approved Multi-hazard Mitigation Plan 
 
Category Subcategory 
 
The Carrot and the Stick: Federal Disaster 
Funding and Eligibility 
Post-disaster reimbursement eligibility 
 A necessary evil 
 
Hazard Experience & Risk Perception  
 
 
  
Perceived Value and Benefit Challenges implementing the plan 
 Too many strings attached 
 Rural communities don’t benefit 
  
 
4.1.1. The Carrot and the Stick: Federal Disaster Funding and Eligibility 
 
The “Carrot and the Stick” concept describes the participants’ belief that one of the 
purposes of having an approved plan for their jurisdiction is that it qualifies their 
community for federal disaster resources and funds. Specifically, the U.S. government now 
requires local and state governments to have a FEMA-approved multi-hazard mitigation 
plan in order to qualify for Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) and Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program (HMGP) project grant dollars (FEMA, 2007).  These programs, which fall under 
the DMA 2000 legislative directive, are critical sources of federal funding, especially for a 
community that wants to pursue mitigation projects using PDM dollars, or for a community 
that needs HMGP funding following a presidentially declared disaster.  One emergency 
manager said, “It is the sole reason why we do it.” Another participant expressed when 
asked why they plan, “It’s about probably 90 percent is the threat of not receiving funds if 
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you don’t have the plan.” All of the county-level emergency managers that were 
interviewed indicated that access to federal funds was a motivation to develop and/or 
maintain their hazard mitigation plans.  This is in-line with Schwab and Brower’s (2008) 
findings that many of the communities that have participated probably would not have done 
so had it not been for the legislative mandate.   
4.1.1.1. Post-disaster reimbursement eligibility 
Even though the opportunity for both pre- and post-disaster funding, as outlined in 
DMA 2000, is dependent upon having an approved hazard mitigation plan, many 
participants seemed driven more by the potential for post-disaster funding. One participant 
indicated that the impetus to have an approved plan was “You are able to seek 
reimbursement for your damages.” The participant further reiterated “if we didn’t get 
reimbursement, there's a lot of stuff that would not get fixed.” As one emergency manager 
said, “If there wasn’t a threat of some FEMA funding getting held back during a disaster, I 
think very few of the incorporated cities in [omitted] County would actually even bother 
with completing it.” 
4.1.1.2. A necessary evil 
One emergency manager summarized his feelings toward the mitigation planning 
requirement with the following statement: 
I think the hazard mitigation plan is just a real, real burden to the political 
subdivisions.  They have to jump through the hoops that FEMA makes you do.  To 
hire a consultant to do this plan ranges along the neighborhood of maybe $20,000 to 
$50,000 per county, so it’s a very, very expensive plan to complete and this requires 
an awful lot of work on the county’s part to complete the plan, and I question in my 
28 
 
mind whether it's actually worth the expenditures. But we’re doing it because it’s a 
federal mandate and if we don’t do it then there’s certain types of disaster funds that 
we don’t receive if we get a presidential disaster declaration …. So you’re talking to 
someone that’s not a big fan of this plan at all, but we do it [italics added]. 
Overall, participants recognized the need for their communities to have a FEMA-approved 
hazard mitigation plan. However, some participants also seemed at odds whether an 
incident would ever necessitate the need for post-disaster federal funding, or be so severe 
that their community would meet the threshold for a presidential disaster declaration.  
4.1.2. Hazard Experience and Risk Perception  
 
 Due to the proximity of local jurisdictions in the study area to the Red River, it was 
presumed by the researcher that flooding would emerge as a strong motivating factor for 
participants to have an approved hazard mitigation plan. At the time the majority of 
interviews for this study were conducted, the Red River Valley in North Dakota had just 
experienced unprecedented flooding the previous year. Not surprisingly, the justification 
offered in many of the interviews for having a hazard mitigation plan was predominately 
focused on flooding. Although this was expected, participants who perceived their flood 
risk to be low tended to diminish the importance of having a hazard mitigation plan. For 
example, one participant concluded:  
We don’t have any floodplains in our county. We don’t have any major needs for a 
buyout of a major city or a block. Our mitigation is very minimal. We have used it 
very little. That is why it is not worth the money for us to put it in place. 
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One municipal leader stated, “They [county] got a mitigation plan, one we don’t get 
flooding in here, so we don’t ever get anything out of that with FEMA, so there’s really not 
a lot we can do here with that.”  
In some instances, participants whose community did face the threat of significant 
flooding still devalued the hazard mitigation plan. One emergency manager noted: 
I don’t think anyone really cares about the plan that much because [omitted] 
residents know where the flooding is, they know how high the water is.  When they 
forecast it, they know what to expect and nobody opens up that hazard mitigation 
plan to assist them in flood fighting any way. 
Another participant added, “We are pretty much flood proof. We bought out so much, the 
floods don’t affect the cities very much. We are in pretty good shape. The major cities are 
built away from the river.”  
Based on the data analysis, the perceived risk of flooding seemed to be a major 
motivational factor in participants’ determination of the mitigation plan’s benefit to their 
respective community. Because the flood risk was such a central focus of the participants, 
most likely due to the recent historic flooding event in the region, it seemed their view of 
the hazard mitigation planning directive was not through an all-hazards lens.  
4.1.3. Perceived Value and Benefit 
 
A number of participants, specifically those from the smaller rural jurisdictions, 
expressed that the hazard mitigation plan lacked value and relevance for their community. 
One interviewee stated:   
 Our county is less than 2,000 people in our whole county. For us to do a hazard 
mitigation plan that costs $20,000 and do it every five years it’s foolish, we will 
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never get any use out of it. Every five years we are throwing away 20 to 30 grand to 
do an update plan based on the feds. 
Another participant stated that the common sentiment in his county was, “Why are you 
asking us to do this when it really provides no benefit for us.” Similarly, another 
emergency manager shared:  
Well, the question that I always get from them [municipalities] is why do I have to 
do this?  What’s the value for us?  You’re asking us to do this but we’ve never been 
able to take advantage of any of the benefits. 
4.1.3.1. Challenges implementing the plan 
While one of the perceived benefits of having an approved plan is the eligibility of 
both pre- and post-disaster federal funds, many participants found the implementation of 
their plans, particularly to take advantage of pre-disaster mitigation funds, to be just as 
cumbersome and challenging as developing and maintaining the plan itself. In fact, the 
perception that having an approved mitigation plan provided no benefit was largely 
associated with the perceived inability to apply for and be eligible to receive funding for 
their pre-disaster mitigation projects. For example, one emergency manager stated: 
The challenge of implementing the plan does not justify the cost of developing a 
plan. We spent like $8,000 to do a mitigation plan. We had the plan done. We 
applied for four projects. They were all turned down. So I am saying, okay, we 
spent $8,000 to do four projects. They all got turned down. Each project was 
probably $4,000 a piece. We could have done two of the projects for what I spent to 
apply for the project. So this is not working, my math does not corroborate. We 
don’t need a plan. We will take the money and do our own mitigation. Well, they 
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don’t want that either. So they say you can’t do that. Well look, if you don’t have a 
mitigation plan, you don’t qualify for any FEMA aid. So, it is the old carrot and the 
stick. We will dangle it here, and you have to do this or we cut off all of your funds. 
So they black mail us. And we understand it, because there are things you have to 
black mail people to get things done. But this is a case where we see no benefit out 
of the mitigation plan. It has not helped our county except for these last two floods 
we are getting a little mitigation money. 
When asked if municipalities perceive the benefits of having a hazard mitigation plan, one 
emergency manager noted,  
See, I believe they understand, they understand.  But they just don’t seem to interest 
them.  I think, because of the, it is you know, takes two years to get even the money 
if you have a project.  But we just don’t meet those thresholds. 
Another participant added, “But I mean it would be worth it if we would be able to be 
eligible for it.  I mean, but it seems like there are roadblocks; every time there is someone 
wants to mitigate something and gets kind of thrown out because of ineligibility.” This 
emergency manager, while talking about the plan development process, expressed the 
following:   
It was a lack of interest on their [municipalities] part because they didn’t understand 
it for one thing and when you put your risks and hazards down, nothing was going 
to come of it, they weren’t going to get any funding for their hazards.  So they 
weren’t really interested...  There were some cities, of course, that took it seriously 
but for the most part, we had to almost fill out the form ourselves for some of those 
jurisdictions because they really didn’t care. 
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Another emergency manager described the challenge of getting municipalities to see the 
value of the hazard mitigation plan with the following statement: 
Exactly and it doesn’t play off so much from the planning piece although from my 
perspective it’s certainly evident but from taking advantage of being a plan 
participant and being able to apply for funding of a project, it becomes very difficult 
for them from a personnel standpoint and from a cost standpoint because there is a 
cost involved typically.  From what I hear from these communities is number one, 
we don’t have the staff to prepare projects to apply for grants and we don’t have 
funds to match that grant.  And we don’t have funds to hire consultants to help us… 
engineering firms for example, which is typically what any of the communities use 
to go ahead and do that work.   
4.1.3.2. Too many strings attached  
Similarly, one emergency manager observed that there is a perception that there are 
too many “strings attached.” He stated:  
I get mad at some of these townships. I have 20 townships in my county. I am 
trying to give them all the FEMA money I can for these floods, and a lot of the guys 
have told me we don’t want it. The rules that they require from us to do, we don’t 
want the money. We will do it ourselves. We will buy our own stuff. We will pay 
for our own contractors. We will fix our roads. We don’t want FEMA’s money 
because there are too many strings attached. 
4.1.3.3. Rural communities don’t benefit 
One sentiment among some of the interviewees, specifically those from smaller 
rural jurisdictions, was that mitigation is for large jurisdictions. The perception among 
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some of the respondents in rural locations was that the mitigation program was designed 
for larger jurisdictions, and thereby precludes them from many of the potential benefits. For 
example, one participant stated, “… for a small community, rural town like ours…I don’t 
think we would see any of it.  I mean the money is getting tighter…the cost benefit is not 
going to be there for small communities.”  
4.2. Capability and Capacity Factors that Inhibit Mitigation Plan Development 
 
 The study explored and identified a number of capability and capacity factors that 
were perceived by the study participants to inhibit the development and maintenance of 
hazard mitigation plans in the study area. As noted earlier, capacity, in reference to disaster 
management planning, can be broadly defined as the amount of resources available to an 
organization to execute or carry out certain functions to promote the safety and well-being 
of a community.  Capability can be defined as the actual ability of an institution or 
individual to perform the necessary actions. The major themes that were explored were the 
following: participation from key stakeholders, knowledge, staffing, and financial 
resources (see Table 4).     
4.2.1. Lack of Participation from Partnering Agencies and Municipalities 
Although some participants acknowledged that the absence of interest and 
enthusiasm toward the hazard mitigation plan was a result of the perceived lack of benefit 
as discussed in the previous section, other participants expressed frustration that key 
partners, such as municipalities, seemed disengaged as a whole. Because documenting 
participation and outreach is a requirement to achieving a FEMA-approved plan, obtaining 
buy-in and participation from key jurisdictional partners, political leaders, and the general 
public is essential. One interviewee indicated: 
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It’s not just attending a meeting, getting them I guess, I wouldn’t say participation 
so much as investment. You know, getting them actually invested in the plan and 
wanting to help and wanting to be a part of the whole process. Not just here we are 
having a public meeting, come look at the plan. 
Another participant stated, “The only way we got participation out of these incorporated 
cities was we threatened them that they wouldn’t be eligible for certain types of disaster 
assistance.” 
 
Table 4.  Capability and Capacity Factors that Inhibit Mitigation Plan Development and 
Maintenance 
 
Category Subcategory 
Lack of participation from partnering 
agencies and municipalities Volunteerism 
 
Lack of Knowledge & Understanding  
  
Staffing Limitations Lack of time 
 Rural employees wear many hats 
 Lack of paid staff 
 Lack of expertise 
 Cumbersome approval process 
 Staffing limitations necessitates prioritization 
 
Financial Capacity Limitations 
 
Expectation of grant dollars 
 
When asked if recent disasters had elicited greater participation during the plan 
development process, one participant stated, “I don’t think so… because I think they are 
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sick of it.” Another indicated that “It’s difficult to engage those communities in 
participating for variety of reasons.  Number one, it takes a great deal of time on my part to 
engage them.” The lack of interest and participation was further reiterated by one 
participant who indicated the following:   
And as far as, basically what they did for their public meeting is when the city 
council met, they just put it on as an agenda item and to our knowledge I don’t 
think, probably anybody ever showed up and they had the plan there in case the 
public wanted to review it and then their city council just approved the plan as is, 
and basically the plan was a template that we did for them. 
4.2.1.1. Volunteerism 
The lack of participation for some areas could be attributed to the rural 
characteristics and volunteer dependency of some of these communities. In some of these 
communities, participants expressed that in addition to fulfilling their civic duties, many 
key planning stakeholders have occupations. One participant noted that “all of our 
emergency services are volunteers. We are all volunteer fire, volunteer ambulance, we 
volunteer for pretty much everything.”  Another emergency manager noted many of the 
key individuals would have to take vacation to participate in some of these planning 
meetings.   
4.2.2. Lack of Knowledge & Understanding 
 
 Some participants suggested that the lack of motivation to participate in the hazard 
mitigation plan development and maintenance process was due to a lack of understanding 
of the mitigation program itself. One municipal leader stated: 
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 You know I think, I don’t think a lot of the municipalities, you know city 
government even county governments understand that many aspects of what the 
hazard mitigation plan can do for them. Like for example, we have some buyouts 
going on in the City of [omitted] where those were made possible because of the 
hazard mitigation plan that was in place, so if they wouldn’t have had an approved 
plan they would have never been able to, you know, probably have their mitigation 
grant to use some of the money for a home acquisition. 
When referring to the awareness and support of elected officials toward the mitigation plan, 
one emergency manager stated, “They are all very supportive of it, but they don’t want to 
take the full responsibility, they never want to be in-charge of them….I think that is mostly 
it, you know it’s a lack of understanding of what it is and how involving they are supposed 
to be.” Speaking generally, another interviewee stated, “I think that’s what we run into in 
the past, nobody really knows their role, exactly where they sit in the plan.” 
4.2.3. Staffing Limitations 
 
 This study provided insight into the limited staffing capacity and capability of many 
rural emergency managers with respect to the mitigation planning directive. The major 
themes that emerged were related to lack of time, limited personnel, and lack of expertise. 
Participants also indicated having to fulfill multiple roles as a limiting factor in developing 
and maintaining their hazard mitigation plan.    
4.2.3.1. Lack of time 
The issue of time was a reoccurring theme. When compared to other factors such as 
cost, the general sentiment was that time was more inhibiting than cost. The following 
statement exemplifies this point:    
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It’s the time. I would say on a scale of time versus cost. You are looking at 80/20. 
Eighty percent time issue, 20 percent cost issue. The cost issue is really not that big 
of a deal. For the cost, we can always get money from the feds.  
Many participants noted how time consuming it is to do the mitigation plan. One 
interviewee noted, “I would have to dedicate a lot of my time just to do the plan.” Another 
emergency manager said the reason they hire a contractor to do their plan is because it is so 
“time consuming.” This interviewee concluded that “most of these cities don’t have two 
months to sit down and do a mitigation plan or even assisting us in doing the plan.” 
Similarly, another emergency manager noted that the challenge of getting many key 
stakeholders to the table during the mitigation planning process is because of the 
“time/benefit ratio.” According to this participant, “The time we put into it is not worth the 
benefit we get out of it.” In fact, one emergency manager emphatically noted:  
If I tell them I can get them $50,000 worth of free equipment for grants for your fire 
department if you just show up to this meeting, I can barely get them to show up at 
the meeting. Because they haven’t got the time. 
There was also a reoccurring sentiment among the participants that all they did was plan. 
One participant noted, “We do so many of these plans that we are planned to death.” 
4.2.3.2. Rural employees wear many hats  
It should be noted that part of the issue with lack of time that many participants 
spoke of could be attributed to the reality that many of these individuals are assuming many 
different positions within their respective communities. One participant observed, “Most of 
us are small agencies. I am a one man office. It is just me. I am the emergency manager, 
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911 coordinator, county coroner. You have several hats plus, I do all the truck permits for 
overweight trucks.” Another participant said:  
I am alone here. Right now I am supposed to be 50 percent emergency manager …. 
25 percent 911 coordinator, and 12.5 percent coroner, 12.5 percent permit officer. 
But right now this FEMA stuff is consuming 95 percent of my time. 
4.2.3.3. Lack of paid staff 
In addition to wearing multiple hats, many participants described their position as a 
“one-man office”. One interviewee noted that there are only two full-time emergency 
managers in the state of North Dakota. The interviewee indicated that as the communities 
become more rural, this issue is further exacerbated. Another common sentiment was 
articulated by one participant, who indicated, “We contracted our hazard mitigation plan 
out because we didn’t have the staff to work on the requirements for that plan.” 
4.2.3.4. Lack of expertise 
The mitigation planning process, especially the requirement to conduct a risk 
assessment can be a daunting task. It also requires technical knowledge and expertise, and 
in most cases, technical skills, such as GIS and HAZUS.  Given the perceived technical 
requirements of the hazard mitigation plan, many participants noted their individual lack of 
expertise to carry-out specific components of the plan. When asked where the hazard 
mitigation plan ranked in complexity versus other plans, one emergency manager stated, 
“Significantly more complex.” Another participant noted, “If someone wants to help me 
out, you think I am going to push him away? Not in your life!” Another stated, “… they 
ask for so much detail. So much of it is overwhelming. Most of us don’t have the 
expertise.” Another interviewee stated: 
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Another part of that is, is that we’re required to just furnish them with digitized 
maps and you’re talking to someone at our office that has no availability nor do we 
know how to do digitized maps.  So that’s a component, if we can find somebody to 
do it for us within the government system, it’s great.  But if we can’t, then we have 
to go outside and hire someone to actually do it. 
An interesting finding was, due to the perceived lack of expertise, some interviewees 
indicated their dependence on planning commissions and consultants to assist them in the 
plan development process. One county emergency manager resolved, “This time around 
I’m looking at hiring one of the regional planning councils to help do the work because the 
scope of this planning project has changed significantly and gotten larger.” Another 
participant indicated that one of the reasons to outsource the plan is “not having to worry so 
much about the accounting details and the grant application and the quarterly reports and 
all that kind of stuff.” 
4.2.3.5. Cumbersome approval process 
The staffing limitations and lack of expertise are probably best exemplified by the 
experience of participants as they described the hazard mitigation plan approval process. 
One interesting finding from this study was the common theme among emergency 
managers regarding their frustration over how picky and stringent the requirements are to 
get the plan approved. One emergency manager noted, “I would feel more comfortable if 
the state took over the plan because they know all the rules and all the guidelines.” Another 
participant stated, “The state knows all the rules and guidelines. They are the ones that have 
to approve the plans anyway so they should do it.” Another participant observed: 
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Many of us before have sent our plans in and then it comes back and then they 
reject a bunch of it and then we get to spend another month to redo all the rejections 
and then we send it back in again. By the time we get the plan done we are ready 
for another plan two years later. We are beating a dead horse. 
The perceived challenges of getting a plan approved were described by one emergency 
manager when he emphatically stated:  
So much of it is that they want different semantics they want. They want us to say 
things a certain way so it qualifies or meets you know what some guy in 
Washington, D.C. has concocted in his little office or cubicle to justify his job...We 
don’t know all the buzz words. We don’t know all the phrasing or phraseology... 
Interestingly, minor issues, such as grammar seemed to be particularly frustrating for some 
participants. For example, one participant stated: 
One plan we sent in it got rejected because the grammar was not right. So we took 
the plan and sent it to an English professor and they went through it and critiqued it 
and corrected it and sent it back. We sent it through and told them by the way, if 
you find something wrong with the plan it was screened by an English professor. 
The plan went right through. A lot of this is it’s kind of a game. 
Another emergency manager expressed, “… the time consuming part of when it gets turned 
back all the time, because of just dumb things like grammar.” 
 The data analysis suggests that many participants’ primary objective, given their 
frustration and reservations over the mitigation plan approval process, is simply to obtain a 
FEMA-approved plan. One participant stated that when doing the plan, their thought 
process is, “What do you want us to say here” in order to ensure the plan is compliant. 
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Another participant indicated that his elected officials don’t care. He stated, “You know 
they just want to make sure it's done and we’re in compliance.” 
4.2.3.6. Staffing limitations necessitates prioritization 
Some participants noted how overwhelmed they were. As previously stated, many 
participants felt they lacked time, assumed multiple roles within their respective 
jurisdictions, and did not have adequate staffing. Given these and other challenges, it was 
interesting to see how participants prioritized mitigation planning in relation to their other 
responsibilities. For example, one emergency manager described the following:  
So just doing these floods three years in a row back to back. These are 100 year 
floods that we have had once every year for three years now. You can see where I 
am coming from. This has overwhelmed us. And I am so busy with my FEMA 
stuff.  They [the state] asks me when can you do a mitigation plan? I tell them, I can 
get to that probably in two years. We don’t have the man power.” 
4.2.4. Financial Capacity Limitations 
 
 An interesting finding from this study was the issue of financial capacity. 
Specifically, this study explored how participants perceived the financial obligations 
necessary to develop and maintain their hazard mitigation plans.  Interestingly, many of the 
participants were somewhat mixed on this topic. Although the financial issue was not a 
major issue for many interviewees, some participants suggested it may be a bigger issue 
when jurisdictions are required to update those plans. 
4.2.4.1. Expectation of grant dollars 
When asked how participants would procure the funding to develop and maintain 
their hazard mitigation plans, some participants indicated the State would make those funds 
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available. Other participants suggested grant funding would be used. One participant noted, 
“It is not so much the money because we can get grants for most of it. We have told the 
feds don’t mandate something you can’t fund because we don’t have the money to do it. 
We will go without instead of having it.” Another participant said that because grant dollars 
have always been available, the idea that updating the mitigation plan without state or 
federal funds had not even crossed their minds. When participants were asked if their 
elected leadership would be willing to fund future mitigation plan updates without the 
expectation of grant dollars, many interviewees were noncommittal or uncertain. 
In conclusion, this chapter described the key issues and challenges related to the 
development and maintenance of the hazard mitigation plan. The findings suggest multiple 
factors that may serve as actual and perceived obstacles to the development and adoption of 
a FEMA-Approved Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan in the Red River Valley, as shown in 
Figure 3. Challenges associated with limited staffing and manpower capabilities were a 
common theme amongst interviewees. Additionally, participants expressed frustration by 
the lack of buy-in and support from key stakeholders throughout the planning process, 
which some attributed to a lack of understanding of the mitigation program. Interestingly, 
the potential financial limitations and concerns to actually fund the development and 
maintenance of the hazard mitigation plan did not seem to be a major concern for 
interviewees. Finally, the findings suggest that the motivation to actually develop and 
maintain the hazard mitigation plan may be associated with the interviewee’s 
understanding of the broader federal mitigation program and the perceived value this plan 
offers its jurisdiction relative to the amount of effort required to develop and implement a 
FEMA-Approved Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
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 Figure 3. Issues and Barriers 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter discusses findings related to participants’ perception of factors that 
contribute to hazard mitigation planning. This chapter also offers recommendations that 
may improve hazard mitigation planning and remove some of the perceived challenges 
associated with developing and implementing the hazard mitigation plan.   
5.1. Motivation and Participation 
 
Concerning the broader issue of motivation to engage in hazard mitigation 
activities, the findings from this study were, for the most part, consistent with previous 
research on this topic. For example, Godschalk and Brower (1985) found that the lack of 
initiative toward mitigation activities and strategies by local governments may be due, in 
part, to the low priority given to disaster-related policies. Similarly, this study also 
observed that many participants, particularly county emergency managers, were frustrated 
by the lack of participation by local municipalities and their leadership, and the overall 
investment into the plan itself by the community. According to Schwab, Eschelebach, and 
Brower (2007), the lack of political support can also be a major obstacle to implementing 
hazard mitigation strategies. Similarly, as one participant in this study noted, while he felt 
the loose support from his elected officials, their leadership lacked full ownership and 
responsibility, which he attributed to elected officials’ lack of understanding concerning 
their role and the purpose behind mitigation planning. Although Horney et al. (2012) 
suggest that inter-organizational coordination in rural areas may be stronger, participants in 
this study, which mostly came from rural areas, suggested the opposite may be true.  
Furthermore, according to Berke and Smith (2009), “plans are often viewed as 
simply a means to an end – gaining access to pre- and post-disaster hazard mitigation 
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funding” (p. 7). As was discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of county-level 
participants in this study also viewed the hazard mitigation plan as a “necessary evil” and 
means to access federal funding. Although this study did not assess plan quality, Berke and 
Smith (2009) found that while mitigation plans may meet minimum national and state 
requirements, mitigation plans lack meaningful and strong “locally-driven mitigation 
actions” (p. 7).  In this study, emphasis on having a “FEMA-approved plan” was repeatedly 
expressed by interviewees as the end goal, and also suggests that the overall objective of 
the hazard mitigation planning process is compliance versus developing a document that 
may have meaningful applications for their respective communities.   
5.2. Human Capacity 
 
An important observation from this study that is consistent with the literature is the 
importance of human capacity or manpower. As other studies have noted, limited staffing 
levels and the lack of technical expertise and experience can serve as major obstacles to 
developing and implementing emergency plans (Godschalk and Brower, 1985; Alesch and 
Petak, 2001; Boswell, Siembieda, and Topping, 2007; Tierney, 1989; Rubin and Barbee, 
1985). Specifically, this study provided insight into the limited staffing capacity and 
capability of many rural emergency managers with respect to the mitigation planning 
directive. Some participants noted their individual lack of expertise to carry-out specific 
components of the plan, such as conducting risk assessments, utilizing GIS, and even 
factors related to technical writing.  
While these issues are important, the findings from this study support the assertion 
by Berke and Smith (2009) that hazard mitigation planning should really fall under the 
purview of local land use planners instead of being “framed in the context of emergency 
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management and considered the responsibility of local emergency management officials 
even though they possess limited experience” (p. 8 ). According to Smith, Lyles, and Berke 
(2012), one way to improve the state-level delivery of technical assistance to local 
jurisdictions involves convincing land use planners and locally elected officials, among 
others, that their active involvement in and support of hazard mitigation planning is 
essential. 
5.3. Financial Capacity 
 
The concept of financial capacity, which Schwab and Brower (2008) defined as the 
ability to “fund or to seek funding for mitigation projects and activities” (p. 10173), was 
not a major obstacle to mitigation planning as was initially expected by the researcher.  
While Lindell and Perry (1992) are correct that many local jurisdictions and their 
governments, on average, may have greater financial constraints and limitations for their 
emergency management departments, this study found that the perceived financial 
resources needed to develop and maintain mitigation plans was not a major concern for 
participants. The perceived expectation among many participants in this study was that 
funding to update and maintain their plans, as it has been in the past, would be provided 
through state and federal funds – namely grants. This does not suggest, however, that 
financial capacity is not important. More importantly, what this study did not capture was 
the financial capacity needed to implement mitigation actions identified in participants’ 
respective plans.  
5.4. Implementation 
 
Although the aim of the study was to focus on hazard mitigation plan development, 
issues related to the implementation of mitigation actions were raised by interviewees. In 
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fact, the perception amongst interviewees that having an approved mitigation plan provided 
little benefit was largely associated with the perceived inability to apply for and be eligible 
to receive funding to implement their plans. Comments such as, “too many strings 
attached” and the suggestion that small rural jurisdictions are precluded from receiving 
funds reinforce an already negative perception of the mitigation program as a whole. 
Moreover, when jurisdictions did try to apply, they found that the same capabilities needed 
in developing the plan were also needed to apply and/or qualify for certain mitigation 
projects.  
Again, because the objective by participants seemed to be compliance, 
implementation was not discussed as a positive outcome or objective of the mitigation 
planning process. In the two instances in which implementation was raised as a possible 
outcome of the mitigation planning process, participants connected the experience with the 
rejection of their proposed mitigation project, and used those experiences to devalue the 
hazard mitigation plan.  
In addressing implementation issues specifically, Horney et al. (2012) found that 
rural communities had higher implementation scores when compared to urban communities 
in their study area. They posited that rural communities have fewer goals and policies and 
less inter-organizational coordination, and are therefore, more likely to implement their 
plans. According to Horney et al. (2012), rural plans are more project based (i.e. 
retrofitting, purchasing generators) and may include a “less diverse array of proposed 
actions than urban plans” (190). Whereas implementation may be higher per their study, 
their findings do not necessarily suggest that the implemented actions address the true 
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purpose of DMA 2000 and the mitigation directive, which is to reduce community 
vulnerability.  
5.5. Recommendations 
 
Currently, it could be argued that the narrow focus of DMA 2000, which seems to 
emphasize planning, as opposed to the more important question of implementation and 
integration of broader community programs and strategies, has created an environment in 
which jurisdictions strive to meet only the minimum federal standards.  Contributing to this 
dilemma is the reality that hazard mitigation planning is typically viewed as an “emergency 
management” function even though other positions within a community may be more 
suited to address the hazard mitigation planning requirements. The following 
recommendations offer realistic considerations that may help to improve the mitigation 
planning process, but also move the discussion beyond just planning, and shift the focus to 
more important topics, such as implementation.  
1. Currently, there is too much onus on emergency management. Instead, jurisdictions 
should shift the mitigation responsibility to community planners who already have a 
broader strategic vision for their respective communities and the skill sets to 
develop a plan. 
2. Emergency management needs to continue evolving professionally. As more 
universities offer degrees in emergency management, more and more emergency 
managers will have the technical knowledge and skills to develop quality mitigation 
plans for their respective jurisdictions. 
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3. States should offer mitigation technical assistance, not only to emergency 
managers, but emphasize and/or require the inclusion of community planners and 
elected leadership.  
4. Mitigation goals, strategies, and actions/projects should focus on what “can” be 
implemented. Expectations should be realistic and measurable.  
5. For hazard mitigation as a whole, the state and Federal governments should 
promote quality versus quantity. They should simplify the hazard mitigation 
planning process and associated requirements, and place more emphasis on 
identifying fewer “quality” mitigation actions/projects that actually serve to 
promote the shared strategic vision for a community. Implementation that results in 
reduced vulnerability, as opposed to developing a plan that meets a federal 
mandate, should be the true focus. 
6. Once those “quality” mitigation projects are identified, states should work closely 
with local jurisdictions in “successfully” implementing those actions. Continual 
rejection or implementing projects/actions that provide little value to the 
community will only reinforce the negative aspects of the program. Conversely, one 
meaningful project that significantly reduces hazard vulnerability and improves 
quality of life may garner greater motivation and participation by key stakeholders 
and the public.   
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter is organized into two sections. The first section summarizes the 
findings from the thesis research. The second section provides key considerations and 
suggestions for future research. 
6.1. Summary 
 
An important question this thesis explored was what factors, conditions, and forces 
contribute to and promote the development and adoption of a FEMA-Approved Multi-
Hazard Mitigation Plan in the Red River Valley.  The original focus of the study was to 
explore the role of capacity, and how it impacted local jurisdictions’ level of hazard 
mitigation plan preparedness. While the researcher initially focused on issues related to 
staffing and financing, it became apparent that the scope of the study needed to be 
expanded to include participants’ overall perspective and feelings regarding the mitigation 
program, and not just the hazard mitigation plan itself.  This was an important discovery. 
Given the expected issues and challenges associated with the actual capacity and capability 
to develop and maintain a hazard mitigation plan, what the researcher found was the 
internal validation of the plan in relationship to the broader federal mitigation program. An 
important underlying question for many respondents seemed to be, “So if I do this plan, 
what does my community get in return?” Therefore, in addition to assessing a jurisdiction’s 
capacity and capability of actually developing the plan, which was the original aim of this 
study, it became apparent that the issue of motivation needed to be explored further.  
Overall, the study found that participants recognized the need for their communities 
to have a FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plan in order to qualify for post-disaster 
federal funding. In fact, many participants’ primary objective, given their frustration and 
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reservations over the mitigation plan approval process, was to simply obtain a FEMA-
approved plan. While this was an important motivation for many participants, some 
questioned if their community would ever have an incident necessitating a presidential 
disaster declaration or if their jurisdiction would even meet the threshold to receive one. 
Additionally, many participants found the implementation of their hazard mitigation 
plans, particularly to take advantage of pre-disaster mitigation funds, to be very 
challenging.  Some participants’ actual and perceived inability to apply for and be eligible 
to receive funding for their pre-disaster mitigation projects served to validate their 
frustration concerning the overall mitigation experience, and devalue its importance to their 
jurisdiction.   
While some participants acknowledged that the waning interest and enthusiasm 
toward the hazard mitigation plan was a result of the perceived lack of benefit as discussed 
in the previous chapter, other participants expressed frustration that key partners, such as 
municipalities, seemed disengaged as a whole. Because documenting participation and 
outreach is a requirement to achieving a FEMA-approved plan, obtaining buy-in and 
participation from key jurisdictional partners, political leaders, and the general public is 
essential. Some participants suggested that the lack of motivation to participate in the 
hazard mitigation plan development and maintenance process was due to a failure to fully 
understand the mitigation program itself. 
The findings of this thesis also provide insight into the limited staffing capacity and 
capability of many rural emergency managers with respect to the mitigation planning 
directive. Key issues that emerged were the perceived lack of time; the reality that many 
rural employees assume multiple roles within their local government organization; the lack 
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of paid and qualified technical staff; and in some limited cases, the actual and perceived 
lack of funds.  
6.2. Future Research and Considerations 
 
 Whereas this study focused on hazard mitigation planning, through the course of 
these interviews, additional considerations for research became apparent. One issue that 
needs further exploration is how local jurisdictions will continue funding the maintenance 
and update of their hazard mitigation plan. Per DMA 2000, each local jurisdiction is 
required to update their plan every five years. Because many of the participants interviewed 
for this study were not in the process of updating their plans, the issue of funding was not a 
major inhibiting factor. Future studies should explore the availability of grant dollars for 
rural jurisdictions to maintain their plans, and explore what funding sources are most likely 
to be utilized. Additionally, future research may want to consider whether jurisdictions will 
update their plan if grant funding is not available.  
 It was also apparent that many participants were seeking a more efficient way of 
developing and maintaining their local hazard mitigation plans. A common solution that 
was often suggested in the interviews was the idea of regionalizing mitigation planning. 
Though regionalization would, on the surface, seem like a way to streamline planning, 
participants often failed to acknowledge that the current FEMA mitigation directive still 
requires the same level of local participation. It is possible certain barriers related to 
technical writing and mapping could be alleviated at the local level if a regional mitigation 
plan was developed; however, it would not necessarily remove or minimize the 
participation of a local county or municipality. The other concern with regionalization is 
plan quality and the plan’s ability to adequately capture the local jurisdiction’s mitigation 
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needs. For example, the State of Texas, which had previously embraced a more regional 
approach, recently instructed local jurisdictions that no more than two counties could be 
part of a local mitigation plan due to plan quality issues.   
 Also, while this study briefly addressed implementation of the mitigation plan, this 
study includes implementation relative only to the perceived benefit of having a FEMA-
approved plan. Future research should explore, more specifically, reasons why many 
mitigation plans fail to be implemented. In addition to interviewing participants in the 
study area, the researcher also interviewed state and federal officials overseeing the FEMA 
mitigation program. These interviews suggested that the bigger concern surrounding the 
mitigation directive is the lack of implementation of identified mitigation actions and 
projects in local jurisdiction hazard mitigation plans.  
 Finally, the study area was mostly rural, and as such, the perceptions and issues 
expressed by the interviewees regarding the hazard mitigation plan process will likely 
differ from other locations. Specifically, in order to better explore and understand the 
challenges surrounding the development of hazard mitigation plans, a comprehensive study 
area that includes both rural and urban settings may be beneficial.  
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY MANAGERS 
Obtain demographic information (i.e. age, sex, experience, job titles/positions). 
 
Could you tell me about your work (roles and responsibilities) as an emergency manger? 
Probe as necessary. 
 
How would you describe your role in the preparedness and development of Hazard 
Mitigation plans? Probe as necessary.  
 
Compared to other emergency management plans, where does mitigation planning stand in 
regards to the complexity of the plan development and maintenance process. Probe as 
necessary. 
 
 
HAVE PLAN 
 
Why does your jurisdiction develop and maintain a mitigation plan? Probe as necessary. 
 
In your view, how does the Mitigation plan serve to benefit and serve your community?   
• Have you seen any direct benefits? If so, please explain. 
 
What are some obstacles that have inhibited you in the mitigation planning process? 
What do you see as the greatest obstacle to mitigation planning? Probe as necessary. 
How have you addressed these challenges associated with Mitigation Planning? 
 
Who created your plan, and do you feel mitigation planning is something your department 
is capable of doing by itself?  Explain. Probe as necessary (e.g. which part of the plan is 
most important and/or challenging?). 
 
Describe the financial support provided to help develop, maintain, and implement 
mitigation plans in your county or municipality? Probe as necessary (e.g. Is the funding 
adequate?). 
 
Where did the funding to develop a mitigation plan come from?  
 
In your view, what has been the level of support from your political leaders regarding 
mitigation planning? Probe as necessary. 
 
In your view, what has been the level of support from your jurisdiction’s county or 
municipal departments regarding mitigation planning? Probe as necessary. 
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[This question is only for Counties or areas with a multi-jurisdictional plan].  Why have 
some municipalities in your County chosen not to participate as part of your multi-
jurisdictional plan?  
 
 
HAVE NO PLAN 
 
What has prevented your jurisdiction from having a FEMA-approved mitigation plan? 
Probe as necessary. 
 
What are some obstacles that have inhibited you from developing a plan? 
• What do you see as the greatest obstacle to mitigation planning? 
 
Do you feel mitigation planning is something your department is capable of doing by 
itself?  Explain. 
 
Describe the financial support available to you and your department to develop, maintain, 
and implement mitigation plans in your county or municipality?  
 
In your view, what has been the level of support from your political leaders regarding 
mitigation planning? Probe as necessary. 
 
In your view, what has been the level of support from your jurisdiction’s county or 
municipal departments regarding mitigation planning? Probe as necessary. 
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APPENDIX B. STUDY RECRUITMENT MATERIALS 
  
December XX, 2010 
 
 
Dear XXXXX, 
 
My name is Daiko Abe. I am a graduate student in the Emergency Management program at 
North Dakota State University in Fargo, ND. I am writing to invite you to participate in my 
graduate research study. This is a study about hazard mitigation planning, and I am 
specifically interested in interviewing local emergency managers in the Red River Valley, 
which is why I am inviting you to take part in this study. As part of this study, I am 
interested in learning what factors, conditions, and forces contribute to and promote the 
development and adoption of a FEMA-Approved Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan.  I am 
hoping you can help me better understand how emergency managers in this area perceive 
and interpret the mitigation planning directorate, and also hope to discover what factors and 
conditions enable or prevent emergency managers from developing and adopting hazard 
mitigation plans. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study and would like to schedule an interview with me, 
please reply to this e-mail as soon as possible, and I will contact you to set up a time and 
day when I can interview you to discuss your experience developing and maintaining 
hazard mitigation plans. These interviews can be conducted either in-person or via 
telephone, and will be arranged at your convenience. Only one 30-minute interview session 
is anticipated, with the potential for a very short follow-up session, if needed.  
 
Most importantly, please recognize that I will make every effort to keep our discussions 
and any identifiable information as private as possible. However, because my study area is 
the Red River Valley, and my population sample will be somewhat limited, I cannot 
promise absolute confidentiality or anonymity. That being said, every effort will be made 
to ensure that any identifiable information is omitted from the research study in order to 
protect your identity and to prevent readers from being able to deduce the identity of the 
participants.  With your permission, I will be using a digital audio recorder in order to 
ensure responses are accurately notated and analyzed.  Again, every effort will be made to 
safeguard these recordings, and digital files will be stored on only one (1) highly secure 
and password protected computer.  These digital recordings and their files will be promptly 
destroyed/deleted at the conclusion of this study.  
 
Also, please keep in mind that your participation is completely voluntary and you may 
withdraw from this study at anytime.  If you have any questions about the study, please e-
mail or contact me at: 
 
E-mail: daiko.abe@ndsu.edu 
Phone: (208) 390-2021 
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Your input is vital to the success of this study. Thank you very much for your consideration 
and assistance. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Daiko N. Abe. Graduate Student  
Emergency Management Program 
North Dakota State University 
Dept. 2351 
Fargo, ND 58108 
 
For questions about your rights a research participant, or to report a complaint, contact 
the Human Research Protection Program at:  ndsu.irb@ndsu.edu, or (701) 231-8908 
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APPENDIX C. IRB APPROVAL 
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